



## **Towards Genuine Responsibility-Sharing in the International Refugee Regime: Solidarity and Resettlement as a Response to Unequal Burdens and Democratic Spoilers**

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### **I) Introduction**

This contribution to the RODA program is an exercise in considering the intersections between the international community's response to global displacement crises, the renewal of commitments to multilateral institutions, and solidarity with Global South host states in the interest of supporting democratic norms and protection standards. It argues that like-minded democratic states can and should commit to predictable targets for responsibility-sharing around resettling refugees and funding the international refugee regime, towards the triple goals of decreasing the number of people displaced internationally, alleviating burdens on Global South host states, and providing an exemplar of how international cooperation can reinvigorate the international refugee regime.

The first, brief section offers an overview of historical and political processes that have eroded principles of solidarity and commitments to international humanitarian and human rights law, which underpin state obligations to displaced people and to other states. It examines the narrowing of durable solutions for refugees, increased reliance on containment and externalized controls to keep refugees in regions of origin, offshoring asylum procedures, and how democratic states burden-shift, free-ride, and act as spoilers to equitable responses to displacement crises.

The second section focuses on core norms of the international refugee regime, particularly the norm of responsibility-sharing. After explaining the roots and contemporary practice of responsibility-sharing, the paper then problematizes "common but differentiated responsibilities" which essentially means that rich democratic states fund long-term refugee populations in regions of origin, while Global South states bear the burdens of hosting. It highlights missed opportunities for developing clear benchmarks for responsibility-sharing through the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees through additionality in international resettlement.

The final section argues that a club of dedicated states can reinvigorate the refugee regime by committing to predictable responsibility-sharing. It suggests that reconceptualizing dividends of responsibility-sharing as club goods and pre-emptively sidelining spoilers to global solidarity will allow for necessarily bold action. It presents practical opportunities for solidarity to alleviate acute

displacement crises, in concert with host states. It concludes with priorities for stable funding for the refugee regime and associated humanitarian agencies. These proposals carry political risk, particularly by incentivizing free-riding and offering host states opportunities to coerce instrumentalize refugee populations for concessions. But the trajectories towards control, erosion of protection standards, and radically unequal burdens mean that bold action is necessary to show that genuine responsibility-sharing can work in practice.

## **II) International Displacement and Global Solidarity**

It has become something of a platitude to note that the world is facing unprecedented displacement, yet the numbers bear repeating in the context of calls for reinvigorating global solidarity. As of 2022, almost 90 million people were displaced globally, including 27.1 million refugees and 4.6 million asylum seekers.<sup>1</sup> The total stock of displaced people has accelerated rapidly over the last decade, and statistics do not include the 6.9 million displaced from Ukraine, making it the largest and most rapid displacement crisis in the post-WWII era. As noted below, the international response to Ukraine stands in stark contrast to displacement from Global South states. 7.1 million remain displaced twelve years after the start of the Syrian civil war – the majority of whom are hosted in neighbouring states. An additional 6.5 million people have fled Venezuela, and reside under various forms of protection and legal status throughout Latin America.

Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East host the vast majority of the world's refugees. 72% are hosted in neighbouring states, and 83% are hosted in low and middle-income countries. The world's Least Developed Countries host 27% of displaced people. While the duration of displacement remains staggeringly high, global averages are skewed by dynamic conflict situations. For example, two million Afghans have been in exile for up to 40 years, while the majority of Syrians have been in exile for ten years or less.<sup>2</sup> Suffice it to say that most remain in regions of origin, with slim chances of returning home or being resettled to Global North states.

### **A) The Post-Cold War Era: Global Mobility Divides and Narrowing Durable Solutions**

During the Cold War, the UN in general and the refugee regime specifically were politicized along East / West lines, and the UNHCR was largely a Eurocentric organization.<sup>3</sup> Refugees from communist states were seen as a political victory for liberal democracies, and seen as “voting with their feet.” The refugee regime often served as a “Cold War sideshow.”<sup>4</sup> Global mobility dynamics underwent significant changes in the immediate post-Cold War period. New civil wars meant the majority of refugees originated in Global South states, and ensuing asylum crises in Europe influenced public sentiment; narratives of “bogus” asylum seekers and “queue jumpers” gained traction. Changing conflict dynamics and pressure from donor states meant UNHCR moved away from its “exilic bias” which favoured resettlement and host state naturalization, to return to countries of origin as the preferred durable solution to

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<sup>1</sup> See UNHCR *Refugee Population Statistics Database*. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/>.

<sup>2</sup> See Devictor, Xavier. 9 December 2019. “2019 Update: How long do refugees stay in exile? To find out, beware of averages,” *World Bank Blogs*. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/2019-update-how-long-do-refugees-stay-exile-find-out-beware-averages>.

<sup>3</sup> Loescher, Gil. 2017. “UNHCR’s Origins and Early History: Agency, Influence, and Power in Global Refugee Policy,” *Refuge* 37(1): 77-86.

<sup>4</sup> Hansen, Randall. 2003. “Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and Its Lessons.” *The Political Quarterly* 74(s1): 25–38.

displacement, calling the 1990s the “decade of returnees”.<sup>5</sup> The change in durable solutions and nature of conflict meant growing refugee populations in the Global South, increased “irregular secondary movement” for recognized refugees to claim asylum in safe countries, and increased demand to circumvent migration controls.<sup>6</sup>

Likewise, while global visa-free mobility increased at the aggregate level throughout the 1990s and 2000s, migration options became increasingly unequal. Tightened labour mobility and the effective closure of pre-existing circular migration systems, particularly in Europe and the United States, contributed to “categorical substitution”<sup>7</sup> from regular mobility to asylum, and “deflections into irregularity”<sup>8</sup> for those who would otherwise travelled regularly. The result was a (still ongoing) “global mobility divide” wherein visa free-travel has increased for rich, Global North states, and restricted for Global South states.<sup>9</sup> Restrictions on temporary visas are particularly targeted at, and responsive to, states with high numbers of asylum seekers.<sup>10</sup>

### **B) Third Countries, Containment, and Externalized Controls**

One upshot was a reactionary and iterative cycle between irregular migration and control policies. Rich democracies have developed ever-more comprehensive mobility controls, with a focus on containing migrants and refugees in third countries and externalizing controls to “prevent migrants, including asylum seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories or destination countries or regions or making them legally inadmissible without individually considering the merits of their protection claims.”<sup>11</sup> Externalized controls include tactics like fortified borders and interdictions at sea and land, but are more often technical controls including carrier sanctions and liabilities, and above all visa controls and migration cooperation agreements. As Prof. Ayelet Shachar noted in her contribution to RODA, borders “no longer stand fixed at the country’s territorial edges.”<sup>12</sup> Politicians in liberal democracies routinely obfuscate the structural determinants of irregular migration, blaming criminal organizations and vowing to “smash” or “break” smuggling and trafficking rings, instead of recognizing the need for safe and legal pathways for mobility, much less their culpability.

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<sup>5</sup> On the UNHCR’s earlier “exilic bias” see Loescher, Gil, Alexander Betts, & James Milner. 2008. *The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. New York: Routledge.

<sup>6</sup> For a brief discussion on irregular secondary movement of recognized refugees see Long, Katy and Jeff Crisp. 2010. “Migration, Mobility and Solutions: An evolving perspective,” *Forced Migration Review* 35: 56-57. <https://www.fmreview.org/disability/long-crisp>.

<sup>7</sup> de Haas, Hein, Katharina Natter, and Simona Vezzoli. 2018. “Growing Restrictiveness of Changing Selection? The Nature and Evolution of Migration Policies,” *International Migration Review* 52(2): 324-367.

<sup>8</sup> Czaika, Mathias & Mogens Hobolth. 2016. “Do Restrictive Asylum and Visa Policies Increase Irregular Migration into Europe?” *European Union Politics*, 17(3): 345-365.

<sup>9</sup> Mau, Steffen, Fabian Güzlaue, Lena Laube, & Natascha Zaun. 2015. “The Global Mobility Divide: How Visa Policies Have Evolved Over Time,” *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 41(8): 1192-1213; Neumayer, Eric. 2006. “Unequal Access to Foreign Spaces: How States Use Visa Restrictions to Regulate Mobility in a Globalized World,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 31(1): 72-84.

<sup>10</sup> Smith, Craig Damian. 2022. Visa Policies, Migration Controls, and Mobility Aspirations: Mixed Migration as a Response to Global Regimes of Closure,” *Yale Journal of International Law*, April: 23-35. [https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/1581/files/2022/04/3-Smith\\_Visa-Policies-Migration-Controls-and-Mobility-Aspirations\\_YJIL-ONLINE.pdf](https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/1581/files/2022/04/3-Smith_Visa-Policies-Migration-Controls-and-Mobility-Aspirations_YJIL-ONLINE.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Frelick, Bill, Ian M. Kysel and Jennifer Podkul. 2016. “The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants,” *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 4(4): 190-220.

<sup>12</sup> Shachar, Ayelet. 20 September, 2021. “The Shifting Border: Legal Cartographies of Migration and Mobility.” <https://rodanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Shachar-Shifting-Border-RODA-Final.pdf>.

### **C) Offshoring Asylum**

Some of the architects of the international refugee regime, and leaders in democratic alliance structures, were also policy entrepreneurs around offshoring international protection obligations through safe third country and safe country of origin designations. Referred to as “new approaches” to managing asylum, they were born of the desire to arrest irregular migration around Europe’s peripheries and respond to what policymakers referred to as “asylum shopping” between European states. Domestic safe country instruments were first used by Denmark in 1986 as a means of restricting entry for East German citizens. They were quickly copied by the UK, Germany, Austria and other European states, while simultaneously being directly transferred through EU candidacy criteria, and emulated further abroad by states including Canada, the US, and Australia.

Safe country designations rely on the doctrine of “effective protection”, implying that a state to which a removed or rejected asylum seeker is returned meets the requirement for *non-réfoulement* – the regime’s peremptory norm and a binding legal duty.<sup>13</sup> The notion that asylum seekers should have sought protection at an earlier point in their journey has been broadened to the point where states push back asylum seekers to transit countries where the likelihood of meaningful protection comparable to Global North states is deeply suspect. These policies have resurfaced and gained ground in recent years, for example the UK’s policy to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda (which emulated a previous Israeli policy to deport East African asylum seekers there), Italian pushbacks to Libya, Spanish pushbacks to Morocco, Croatian and Polish border policies to contain asylum seekers in Bosnia and Belarus respectively, the EU’s 2016 deal with Turkey, and the Trump Administration’s unilateral declaration of Central American states as safe third countries, to name but a few stark examples.

### **D) Burden-Shifting and Spoilers**

The cumulative effect is a global system of burden-shifting, even among democratic allies. For example, during the 2015-16 migration crisis in Europe, Western Balkan and Central European states waived through hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers *en route* to countries like Germany and Sweden. In response, Germany took the initiative to receive a disproportionate number of asylum seekers by suspending transfers to first countries under the Dublin regulations. The ensuing cascade of border closures threatened the very core of the European common market, and led to a doubling-down on deals to contain migrants in autocratic, dangerous, and weak states around Europe’s peripheries.

The absence of solidarity mechanisms contributes to free-riding and burden-shifting, since hosting refugees is considered a zero-sum proposition.<sup>14</sup> For example, the EU’s Dublin Regulations arguably incentivize states to either allow asylum seekers to pass through their territory, or offer less effective protection in a race-to-the-bottom for domestic asylum systems. As discussed below, attempts to create regional ‘distribution systems in Europe have fallen afoul of spoilers since implementation would rely on consensus, and governments reap domestic gains of scuttling negotiations rather than contributing to

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<sup>13</sup> Legomsky, Stephen H. 2003. “Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 15(4): 567-677; Phuong, Catherine. 2005. “The Concept of ‘Effective Protection’ in the Context of Irregular Secondary Movements and Protection in Regions of Origin” *Global Migration Perspectives* no.26. Global Commission on International Migration. Online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/42ce51df4.html>.

<sup>14</sup> See Theilemann, Eiko. 2017. “Why Refugee Burden-Sharing Initiatives Fail: Public Goods, Free-Riding and Symbolic Solidarity in the EU,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(1): 63-82.

solidarity mechanisms. In the worst cases, spoilers operate from logics of nativist “cultural purity” and are thus intractable negotiators, even when offered financial benefits or face-saving alternatives. Narratives of “queue jumpers” and “bogus” asylum seekers have evolved into more pernicious epithets like “invaders”, “parasites”, or “rapists” from incumbents and opposition parties.<sup>15</sup> Spoilers likewise erode democracy at home by politicizing asylum systems, attacking civil society and press, and undermining rule of law.

### III) Responsibility-Sharing in the International Refugee Regime

The international refugee regime is comprised of laws, norms, and institutions to address collective action problems of international displacement. This section focuses specifically on burden-sharing, which stands alongside non-discrimination, non-criminalization, and the peremptory norm of *non-réfolement* as the regime’s core norms. Originally conceived of as “burden-sharing”, and later referred to as “responsibility-sharing” in the interest of not casting displaced people as burdensome, the 1951 Refugee Convention’s preamble states: “Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the UN has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation.”<sup>16</sup> The General Assembly tasked UNHCR with “seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees.” The regime’s core norms are intertwined given that disproportionate burdens may compel states to abrogate their duties, and thus undermine the purpose of the Convention.

#### A) The Norm and Practice of Burden / Responsibility-Sharing

Responsibility-sharing entails that the financial costs of hosting refugees and providing durable solutions through resettlement, naturalization, and return to countries of origin should be equitably distributed.<sup>17</sup> Yet unlike *non-réfolement*, responsibility-sharing remains discretionary, with no binding obligations enshrined in treaties or international law. However, as described below, some legal scholars argue that it is developing towards a soft-law instrument, and potentially a norm of customary international law. Burden and responsibility-sharing was the central topic of discussion at the first Global Refugee Forum in 2019. In its conclusion, High Commissioner Grandi noted that “Without meaningful responsibility-sharing, we will not achieve solidarity.”<sup>18</sup>

The absence of meaningful solidarity has had significant political consequences, particularly by offering autocratic or authoritarian states opportunities to extract financial, political, and security concessions from Global North states. The cases of Libya under Ghadaffi and Turkey during the 2015-16 migration

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<sup>15</sup> For compelling comparative work see Hogan, Jackie. 2015. “Floods, Invaders, and Parasites: Immigration threat narratives and right-wing populism in the USA, UK, and Australia,” *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 36(5): 520-543.

<sup>16</sup> Discussions around the drafting of the Convention specifically noted that state obligations would be limited to refugees on their territory, and could not place binding obligations to burden-share. But certain states saw its inclusion in the preamble as establishing a positive obligation to assist states of first asylum. For discussion see Inder, Claire. 2018. “The Origins of ‘Burden Sharing’ in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 29(4): 523-554.

<sup>17</sup> Milner, James. 2016. “When Norms are Not Enough: Understanding the principle and practice of burden and responsibility sharing for refugees,” *Global Leadership and Cooperation for Refugees Series*, No. 2. Centre for International Governance Innovation.

[https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Refugee%20Paper%20no2web\\_3.pdf](https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Refugee%20Paper%20no2web_3.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> UNHCR. 16 Dec 2021. “States urged to build on progress made since the Global Refugee Forum.” <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/states-urged-build-progress-made-global-refugee-forum>.

crisis offer the clearest contemporary examples where autocratic leaders threaten migration emergencies to extract concession.<sup>19</sup>

Global South states which host large numbers of refugees cite the lack of responsibility-sharing as grounds for forcibly repatriating refugees, and Global North practices as moral precedent.<sup>20</sup> To offer but one example, in 2016 the Kenyan Interior Minister drew on the European response to its migration crisis in announcing the shuttering of Kenya's Department of Refugee Affairs, the closure of the Dadaab refugee camp, and plans to expel almost 300,000 refugees to Somalia. While the decision was ostensibly based on security threats, a statement from the Minister pushed back against human rights criticisms by arguing: "We will not be the first to do so; this is the standard practice worldwide. For example in Europe, rich, prosperous, and democratic countries are turning away refugees from Syria, one of the worst war zones since World War Two."<sup>21</sup>

The lack of solidarity through financial appeals for refugee emergencies likewise comes home to roost for Global North states. Indeed, Europe's migration crisis in 2015-16 was partially triggered by a decline in support for Syrian refugees, particularly in Lebanon and Turkey. And while hosting refugees is statistically unlikely to generate armed conflict, research shows quite clearly that refugee flows to weak states and neighbouring states with existing interethnic tensions can result in the spread of civil conflict across borders, incidents of terrorism, and intercommunal conflict.<sup>22</sup> Regional instability means yet more displacement risk. The upshot is that responsibility-sharing is thus not only a humanitarian imperative, but generates collective goods around regional security, protecting states from democratic backsliding, and preventing nativist, anti-refugee sentiment.

### **B) The Problem with Common but Differentiated Responsibilities**

Practically, responsibility-sharing takes the form of either financial contributions to the UN system and associated humanitarian operations and development programming, or the physical responsibility of hosting refugees. Financial contributions to UNHCR remain discretionary and voluntary, while states in regions of origin are bound by international law to offer asylum. Yet the global distribution of refugees means host states are also some of the least capable to integrate them.

UN instruments and the rationale underlying global responses operate on the logic of "common but differentiated responsibilities," first articulated as such in international environmental law in the 1990s, and operating in practice in the international refugee regime. In a word, Global North states pay, while Global South states shoulder the political and social burdens for hosting, and "resources are presently inversely correlated with protection responsibilities."<sup>23</sup> Or, as Peter Sutherland often noted, the current system ultimately shows that responsibility is defined by proximity. The reality, like much of the

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<sup>19</sup> Greenhill, Kelly M. 2010. *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy*. Cornell University Press.

<sup>20</sup> Hargrave, Karen, Sara Pantuliano, and Ahmed Idris. 2016. "Closing Borders. The ripple effects of Australian and European Refugee Policy: Case studies from Indonesia, Kenya and Jordan," *HPG Working Papers*. Overseas Development Institute. <https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/11147.pdf>.

<sup>21</sup> *The Economist*. 14 May, 2016. "Kenya Says Go Home." Available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21698675-or-are-refugees-bargaining-chips-kenya-says-go-home>.

<sup>22</sup> For a review of the empirical literature on refugee hosting and incidents of violence see Salehyan, Idean. 2019. "Conclusion: What academia can contribute to refugee policy," *Journal of Peace Research* 56(1): 146-151.

<sup>23</sup> Hathaway, James C. 2019. "Assigning Protection: Can Refugee Rights and State Preference be Reconciled?" *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 175(1): 33-45.

distribution of privilege, burden, and hazard in the international system is unfair and regressive, which was recognized at the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention.<sup>24</sup>

The vast majority of states are parties to the Convention and / or its additional protocols, as well as relevant international humanitarian and human rights treaties. In addition, most democratic states have functioning domestic asylum systems, and engage in some degree of refugee resettlement. Global North states contribute the bulk of funding to multilateral agencies that address displacement crises, including the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO).

Yet the number of refugees they resettle remains staggeringly low compared to demand for durable solutions. From 2012 to 2021 just under 1 million refugees were resettled to third countries, at an average of 96, 682 per year. 2020 and 2021 were the lowest years of resettlement in the last decade at 34,383 and 57,436 respectively, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Trump Administration’s defection from multilateral institutions, “extreme vetting” of refugees in the resettlement pipeline, and anti-Muslim immigration policies. Just under 3.7 million returned to countries of origin over that period, with numbers varying widely year on year.<sup>25</sup> To summarize, common but differentiated responsibilities maintain the status quo and privilege rich states’ containment policies.

### **C) *The Global Compact on Refugees: A Missed Opportunity or a Path Forward?***

The period of negotiation for the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) was one of significant turmoil for multilateral institutions and international solidarity. It came in the wake of Europe’s migration crisis when EU member states were actively shifting the burden among allies and doubling down on externalized migration controls, and the US was defecting from international institutions and treaty obligations, and actively threatening to cut funding to UNHCR over its perceived impacts on US sovereignty.<sup>26</sup> Neither states nor the UNHCR could risk re-opening the Convention to consider new modes of binding solidarity.<sup>27</sup>

The GCR was originally considered as an opportunity to put responsibility-sharing norms into practice. Indeed, the 2016 New York Declaration, signed by all 193 UN Member States, and which launched the compact negotiations, called for “a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees.” And while it is framed as providing “a basis for predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing among all UN Member States” and relevant IOs,<sup>28</sup> any notion of binding quotas was discarded after state reactions to the GCR’s zero draft, originally titled a *Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees*.<sup>29</sup> States balked at obligations to meet UNHCR’s

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<sup>24</sup> See Inder, Claire. 2018. *Op Cit*.

<sup>25</sup> UNHCR. 2022. “Solutions Dataset”. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=2MzjUB>.

<sup>26</sup> Ferris, Elizabeth G. and Katharine M. Donato. 2020. *Refugees, Migration, and Global Governance: Negotiating the Global Compacts*. New York: Routledge.

<sup>27</sup> Aleinikoff, T Alexander. 2018. “The Unfinished Work of the Global Compact on Refugees,” *International Journal of Refugee Law*. 30(4): 611-617 (emphasis added).

<sup>28</sup> United Nations. 2018. *Global Compact on Refugees*, Section 4. New York. <https://www.unhcr.org/5c658aed4>.

<sup>29</sup> UNHCR. 2016. *Zero Draft Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees*. <https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/578369114/zero-draft-global-compact-responsibility-sharing-refugees.html>.

identified resettlement needs.<sup>30</sup> Subsequent drafts and the final document did not include benchmarks or oversight, leading noted refugee law scholar James Hathaway to call it a “global cop-out.”<sup>31</sup> States insisted that the renamed GCR would be entirely non-binding, and it ultimately served as an affirmation of existing norms rather than a bold step to reinvigorate or broaden commitments.<sup>32</sup>

The political context of the GCR’s negotiation cannot be understated. Its focus on development aid for host communities and local integration of refugees reflects the long-term *realpolitik* of common but differentiated responsibilities and containment. However, that particular historical and political moment need not define the future of cooperation, particularly given that the GCR was adopted as a non-binding UNGA resolution. Alex Aleinikoff, for example, offered the metaphor of the GCR as a ratchet geared towards “preventing backward slippage and creating opportunities for forward movement.”<sup>33</sup>

#### **D) The Key Role of Additionality in International Resettlement**

Additionality is key to responsibility-sharing and solidarity through international resettlement. In essence, additionality means a larger aggregate number of resettlement quotas by current receiving states, new additions to the number of resettlement countries, and new pathways including private sponsorship or community support models, and complementary labour and family reunification visas for refugees over and above existing commitments.

The GCR includes the goal of expanding resettlement through the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative (GRSI). Based on Canada’s private sponsorship model, it has successfully seeded or supported community sponsorship programs in Europe, Australia, and Latin America.<sup>34</sup> Most recently and perhaps most significantly, the Biden Administration announced that the US would launch a large-scale private sponsorship pilot to begin in the Autumn of 2023. Importantly, additionality means new resettlement pathways should not replace current programs, and avoid offloading responsibility to citizens or private actors. While promising, global uptake has been slow. The 2019 Global Refugee Forum resulted in a total of only 60,860 additional resettlement places globally, with 75% coming from Canada and the whole of the EU.<sup>35</sup> In 2021, the UNHCR identified 1,445,383 persons with varying levels of urgent need of protection through international resettlement.<sup>36</sup> Only 57,436 (4%) were actually resettled. Clearly, more needs to be done.

#### **IV) Ways Forward: Additionality, Solidarity, and Political Will**

Original drafts of the 1951 Convention stipulated burden-sharing as including the global redistribution of refugees, but was eventually watered down and replaced with the term “cooperation”. However, legal

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<sup>30</sup> Doyle, Michael. 2018. “Responsibility-Sharing: From Principle to Policy,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 30(4): 618-622.

<sup>31</sup> Hathaway, James C. 2018. “The Global Cop-Out on Refugees,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 30(4): 591-604.

<sup>32</sup> Micinski, Nicholas R. 2021. *UN Global Compacts: Governing Migrants and Refugees*. New York: Routledge

<sup>33</sup> Aleinikoff, T Alexander. 2018. *Op cit*.

<sup>34</sup> <https://refugeesponsorship.org/>.

<sup>35</sup> Yoon, Priscilla and Eric Smith. 2021. *Towards Equitable and Predictable Responsibility Sharing: An analysis of state pledges at the Global Refugee Forum*. InterAction. <https://www.interaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/GRF-Pledge-Report-04-19-21.pdf>.

<sup>36</sup> UNHCR. 2020. *UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2021*. Geneva. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/resettlement/5ef34bfb7/projected-global-resettlement-needs-20>.



scholars have argued that the iterated reference to principles of responsibility-sharing could comprise an emerging norm in customary international law, particularly through its inclusion in the GCR and in European law.<sup>37</sup> And while oversight and binding criteria for responsibility-sharing were discarded from the GCR, it remained a guiding principle in the document and has historical precedent, for example in resettling refugees from the “Indochina” refugee crisis, which revitalized and significantly expanded private refugee sponsorship in Canada. The norm can and should be put into practice.

### **A) Building Solidarity while Sidelining Spoilers: A Club Goods Approach**

The refugee regime was partly designed to solve the collective action problems around international displacement to provide public international goods, which are defined as being *non-excludable* and *non-rivalrous*. For example, clean air and water through commitments to environmental regulations or international security through alliances are enjoyed by all, and their enjoyment by one actor does not inhibit the enjoyment of another. But public goods also inherently incentivize free-riding – i.e., actors enjoy their benefit without efforts or costs to create and maintain them.

While the provision of humanitarian protection is not a public good per se, expanding the scope of analysis beyond individual refugees is fruitful given that “enhanced stability and security provided by one country’s refugee protection efforts will not only benefit [that country, but] all countries in the region, no matter whether those other countries have themselves engaged in costly protection efforts or not. Stability and security benefits produced by refugee protection efforts are in this sense indivisible and non-excludable.”<sup>38</sup> At the global level, providing international protection can help prevent spillovers through conflict or mass influxes of asylum seekers.<sup>39</sup> Commitments to predictable and stable responsibility-sharing would also help foster democracy and rule of law, and as such would enhance global security and prevent democratic backsliding. Global security and democracy are non-excludable public goods, and the incentive to provide them ought to override concerns over free-riding.

To return to the GCR’s *Zero Draft*, a group of the most prominent international NGOs called for an agreement which would monitor and mitigate underperformance, and a “truly global agreement with concrete contingency plans, specific targets and time-bound benchmarks that keep States on track and progressing toward the ultimate goal of equitable responsibility sharing.”<sup>40</sup> Yet the most robust mobility arrangements are geographically limited, and provide excludable club goods to member states. Examples include MERCOSUR in South America, the EU’s Schengen Area, and ECOWAS in West Africa. Regional agreements work because they are delimited, and accrue benefits to self-interested members willing to cede some sovereignty in order to reap dividends.

I suggest that a group of democratic states can embark on a bold experiment in genuine responsibility-sharing by creating a solidarity club, which would commit to responsibility-sharing based on objective

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<sup>37</sup> See Goodwin-Gil, Guy and Jane McAdam. 2007. *The Refugee in International Law*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; Schmalz, Dana. June 2019. “The Principle of Responsibility-Sharing in Refugee Protection,” *Völkerrechtsblog: International Law and International Legal Thought*, Symposium, Customary International Law. <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/de/the-principle-of-responsibility-sharing-in-refugee-protection/>.

<sup>38</sup> Theilemann, Eiko. 2017. *Op Cit*.

<sup>39</sup> See Betts, Alexander. 2009. *Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

<sup>40</sup> Norwegian Refugee Council. 2018. *NGO Reaction to the Xero Draft of the Global Compact on Refugees’ Programme of Action*. [https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/corporate/ngo-reaction-to-the-gcr-zero-draft\\_09.02.18.pdf](https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/corporate/ngo-reaction-to-the-gcr-zero-draft_09.02.18.pdf).

and predictable resettlement additionality and financial contributions to host states. This solidarity club would include Global South host states who would, in turn, commit to the rule of law and fair treatment of refugees.

Promising theoretical and real-world models exist. For example, Matthias Czaika's Refugee Burden Index is based on the number of refugees hosted in proportion to population, employment levels, and GDP per capita, in addition to less readily quantifiable metrics including population absorbance capacity and societal and political stability issues.<sup>41</sup> Germany distributes asylum seekers to Länder based on per capita income and population. An EU-wide distribution system was proposed in 2015, and would have used GDP per capita (40% weight), population (40%), per capita number of asylum applications over the previous five years (10%), and unemployment (10%). Tellingly, it was scuttled by several member states acting as spoilers in the negotiations, particularly Višegrad states.<sup>42</sup>

Crucially, establishing a solidarity club would pre-emptively exclude spoilers. States, and only states, have the prerogative to commit themselves to international agreements. In addition to recognizing the principle of solidarity, the preamble to the 1951 Convention expressed "the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between states." While a club goods approach would not solve the problem of free-riding, it would limit interstate tensions because it would start from common principles.

Far-right xenophobic voting patterns are inversely correlated with the number of refugees and foreigners present at the local level.<sup>43</sup> It is thus unlikely that potential spoilers would join the club in the short or medium term, and nor should they be expected to. To put a fine point on the matter: states like Hungary or Poland should not be invited to the club under current conditions, but membership should be left open. The latter point is crucial. The US under the Trump Administration would not have been expected to commit to binding commitments, but the Biden Administration could take a lead role, and commit subsequent administrations.

The proposal also accounts for the short- and medium-term interests of club members. Resettlement formulas should consider labour market complementarity for a pre-determined proportion of those being resettled, which comports with emerging state practice to develop complementary, labour-based, education, or family reunification resettlement pathways,<sup>44</sup> and for which the academic legwork is well underway.<sup>45</sup> Doing so would mean that states would immediately address the vital need for workers at all skill levels, while still offering pathways to safety for vulnerable people who are currently prioritized for resettlement.

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<sup>41</sup> Czaika, Matthias. 2005. "A Refugee Burden Index: Methodology and its application" *Migration Letters* 2(2): 101-125.

<sup>42</sup> Hilpold, Peter. 2018. "Quotas as an Instrument of Burden-Sharing in International Refugee Law: The many facets of an instrument still in the making," *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 15(4): 1188-1205.

<sup>43</sup> Stockemer, Daniel. 2016. "Structural Data on Immigration or Immigration Perceptions: What Accounts for the Electoral Success of the Radical Right in Europe?" *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 54 (4):999-1016.

<sup>44</sup> See Manks, Michelle, Mehrangiz Mosef, and Dana Wagner. 2022. "Sponsorship in the Context of Complementary Pathways," *Knowledge Briefs*. Refugee Hub, University of Ottawa. <https://refugeehub.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Sponsorship-in-the-Context-of-Complementary-Pathways.pdf>.

<sup>45</sup> Ahani, Narges, Tomy Andersson, Alessandro Martinello, Alexander Teytelboym, and Andrew C. Trapp. 2021. "Placement Optimization in Refugee Resettlement," *Operations Research* 69(5): online.

The greater the number of additional resettlement spots allocated, the larger the number of new immigrants who could immediately contribute to receiving states' labour markets, which would also mitigate the risk of xenophobic reactions. Resettlement formulas could readily include a distribution among those who have been displaced for a short period of time and are thus in closer temporal proximity to their field of training, and those who have been displaced long-term and are not employed or integrated in host states.

Of course, the risk of defection after elections would be a perennial problem – but those dynamics already characterize multilateralism in general and are not a compelling argument against action, and could be mitigated in any case. Club membership might include pooled financial resources. Defection might mean deposits are reallocated to make up for lost resettlement spots, which would then be transferred to maintain aggregate commitments, or to host state members for social welfare provision. Binding and predictable resettlement commitments should likewise be contingent on host state commitments to civil and political rights, and providing meaningful protection for refugees who remain.

In order to be impactful, resettlement numbers would have to be significant and appreciable by host states, and should likely focus on acute situations. Longer-term benefits would accrue to all members, and potentially generate public goods by alleviating security risks in host states and their neighbours. Likewise, engaging in meaningful solidarity signals “a willingness to assist and accept and integrate refugees helps to promote liberal, democratic values in the global arena, and counters extremist voices.”<sup>46</sup>

### **B) Opportunities for Solidarity in Practice**

The four years since the GCR's adoption have seen some signs for hope for greater international solidarity. The world's response to displacement from Russia's invasion of Ukraine offers both positive examples, though also selective solidarity. For example, the EU's Temporary Protection Directive offers immediate residency, employment, healthcare, and education rights, with the added purpose of not over-burdening member states' asylum systems.<sup>47</sup> Humanitarian parole in the US offers residency rights, healthcare, housing, food, and education assistance.<sup>48</sup> Canada has committed to priority processing of Ukrainian travel authorizations and offered immediate permanent residency, as well as waiving all visa fees, offering support for flight costs, and offering additional settlement services akin to those offered to resettled refugees.<sup>49</sup> While these responses represent a clear double-standard when compared to other displacement crises, they also illustrate how states can drop barriers to, and facilitate mobility for, displaced people when the response is motivated by the defence of liberal democracy.

The opportunities for solidarity suggested below are not without political risk. Resettlement of this nature might incentivize autocratic or weak states to decrease services or threaten forced repatriation, but the absence of meaningful responsibility-sharing already contributes to the politicization of displacement and opportunities for coercion. Plans to offer predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing could start to turn that tide. Nonetheless, public messaging should highlight security and

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<sup>46</sup> Salehyan, Idean. 2019. *Op Cit.*

<sup>47</sup> See European Commission. “Information for people fleeing the war in Ukraine.”

[https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-assistance-ukraine/information-people-fleeing-war-ukraine\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-assistance-ukraine/information-people-fleeing-war-ukraine_en).

<sup>48</sup> See US Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Uniting for Ukraine.” <https://www.uscis.gov/ukraine>.

<sup>49</sup> See Government of Canada. “Immigration measures and support for Ukrainians and their families.” <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures.html>.

democracy dividends, economic gains to receiving states, and humanitarian gains for resettled refugees. It would thus provide an oft-touted “triple-win”.

The opportunities described below are meant as examples, and are only a small part of the global puzzle. For example, the exodus from Afghanistan over the last decades and since the Taliban’s victory in 2021 has meant a significant and long-term burden on neighbouring states. Of the 2.6 million Afghan refugees globally, 2.2 million are hosted in Pakistan and Iran. Global North states have faltered in their resettlement commitments, and neither state offers robust integration. Importantly, others have argued for a similar alliance structure to help address that crisis.<sup>50</sup> The plight of Rohingya refugees is largely ignored by global resettlement. Roughly 920,000 reside in unsafe camps in Bangladesh, the majority of whom have arrived since fleeing ethnic cleansing in Myanmar in 2017. The exodus from Venezuela matches the Syrian refugee crisis in scope – 6.8 million people have left the country. 5.75 million reside in Latin America and the Caribbean under various forms of legal protection, with Colombia hosting over 2.5 million alone, and Peru another 1.3 million. There is virtually no resettlement of Venezuelans; Canada and the U.S., the world’s top resettlement countries, resettled fifteen and twenty Venezuelans respectively from 2015 to 2020. The international response is almost entirely financial support to host states, which are struggling with upswings of anti-migrant sentiment among a remarkable trend of hospitality and inclusion.

#### *Opportunity 1: Lebanon and Syrian Refugees*

Lebanon currently hosts 1.5 million refugees, and including long-term Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, hosts the highest number of refugees per capita globally at almost 20% of the total population. More than 80% of Syrians live in extreme poverty. While positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Lebanon are correlated with direct and meaningful contact, public support for long-term hosting has declined significantly in recent years as the country faces a rolling series of fiscal, economic, and political crises.<sup>51</sup>

In June of 2022 Lebanon’s caretaker government announced plans to forcibly repatriate 15,000 Syrians per month starting in the Autumn of 2022, with the cooperation of the Assad regime in Syria, ignoring calls from UNHCR to protect refugees’ human rights. Credible reports by rights organizations have cited systematic abuse and reprisals of returning refugees.<sup>52</sup>

A bold experiment in responsibility-sharing through additional resettlement could help immediately alleviate the impending crisis. For example, a small club of states could commit to a one-year pilot program to resettle 15,000 Syrians per month from Lebanon, on the grounds that Lebanon immediately drops its forced repatriation scheme. A rudimentary distribution formula based on a 50/50 weighting of GDP per capita and population, which included only Canada, the US, and Germany, would resettle a total of 180,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon over a one-year pilot program. Admittedly, the numbers of refugees resettled would significantly increase total resettlement quotas, but each of these states currently have various forms of private or community sponsorship and complementary pathways which could help address the burden.

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<sup>50</sup> See the analysis and proposals in Stewart, Rory. 2022. *The Afghan Refugee Crisis: How to Resurrect the Global Refugee Resettlement Coalition*. Atlantic Council Europe Center. [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/The\\_Afghan\\_Refugee\\_Crisis-.pdf](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/The_Afghan_Refugee_Crisis-.pdf).

<sup>51</sup> Ghosn, Faten, Alex Braithwaite, and Tiffany S. Chu. 2019. “Violence, Displacement, Contact, and Attitudes toward Hosting Refugees,” *Journal of Peace Research* 56(1): 118-133.

<sup>52</sup> Human Rights Watch. 2021. *Syria: Returning Refugees Face Grave Abuse*. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/20/syria-returning-refugees-face-grave-abuse>.

**Proposed Distribution  
Small Solidarity Club**

Country	Population (mil)	Pop share	GDP/capita (USD)	GDP Share	Refugee Share	Monthly Relocation	1 Year Pilot Total
USA	329.5	0.731	64543	0.420	0.576	<b>8,636</b>	<b>103,633</b>
Germany	83.24	0.185	45723	0.298	0.241	<b>3,619</b>	<b>43,428</b>
Canada	38	0.084	43241	0.282	0.183	<b>2,745</b>	<b>32,939</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>450.74</b>	<b>1.000</b>	<b>153,507</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.000</b>	<b>15,000</b>	<b>180,000</b>

Expanding the club to include the top ten resettlement countries from 2015 to 2021 (only including government-sponsored refugees – i.e., without existing additional pathways including private sponsorship or complementary labour schemes) illustrates how broader solidarity more equitably distributes the burden, while maintaining the aggregate impact on Lebanon’s carrying capacity and the human rights of displaced people. For example, a one-year pilot through a larger club would increase Canada’s overall resettlement (including private sponsorship and additional pathways) by just over 50% against 2019 resettlement numbers. While significant, the number is far lower than Canada’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis, which opened an additional 25,000 resettlement spots between 2015 and 2016, and which fell below demand from private sponsorship groups.

**Proposed Distribution  
Top Ten Resettlement States 2015-2021**

Country	Population (mil)	Pop share	GDP/capita (USD)	GDP Share	Refugee Share	Monthly Relocation	1 Year Pilot Total
USA	329.5	0.561	64,543	0.118	0.339	<b>5,089</b>	<b>61,065</b>
Germany	83.24	0.142	45,723	0.083	0.113	<b>1,688</b>	<b>20,255</b>
France	67.39	0.115	38,625	0.070	0.093	<b>1,389</b>	<b>16,662</b>
Ireland	5.05	0.009	83,812	0.153	0.081	<b>1,211</b>	<b>14,530</b>
Canada	38	0.065	43,241	0.079	0.072	<b>1,077</b>	<b>12,918</b>
Australia	25.69	0.044	51,812	0.094	0.069	<b>1,037</b>	<b>12,439</b>
Norway	5.38	0.009	67,294	0.123	0.066	<b>989</b>	<b>11,870</b>
Netherlands	17.44	0.030	52,304	0.095	0.063	<b>938</b>	<b>11,256</b>
Sweden	10.35	0.018	51,926	0.095	0.056	<b>842</b>	<b>10,108</b>
Finland	5.53	0.009	49,041	0.089	0.049	<b>741</b>	<b>8,897</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>587.57</b>	<b>1.000</b>	<b>548,321</b>	<b>1.000</b>	<b>1.000</b>	<b>15,000</b>	<b>180,000</b>

The pilot should be predicated on commitments from Lebanon to halt plans to forcibly repatriate Syrians, and to more equitable access to social services and labour markets. Importantly, it would also mean that existing humanitarian programming to remaining refugees would increase by 12% per displaced person, and significantly more at the household level. Alleviating the burden of hosting also means that existing financial commitments go much further.

*Opportunity 2: Displacement in Central America*

More than 550,00 people are displaced the Northern Central America (NCA) – El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Most reside in Belize, Costa Rica, and Panama. The majority, more than 400,000, were displaced over the last decade. The region has the world’s most urbanized refugee population at 95%, making traditional humanitarian aid challenging. An additional half a million are displaced further abroad, predominantly in Mexico, the US, and Canada. The US and Canada, which together resettle the largest number of refugees annually, largely ignore resettlement from the hemisphere. Of the 155,000 refugees resettled to Canada between 2015 and 2020, only 160, or 0.1%, were from NCA countries. Less than three percent of roughly 270,000 refugees resettled to the US were from Latin America. 3,766, or 1.4%, were from NCA countries.<sup>53</sup>

The GCR’s Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework is implemented in Central America as a regional program under the Spanish acronym MIRPS (*Marco Integral Regional de Protección y Soluciones*). Six countries in Central America signed on to MIRPS in 2016 (Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama) signed on to MIRPS. El Salvador joined in 2019), which built on previous solidarity mechanisms including. MIRPS includes a novel (and manageable) resettlement mechanism through the Protection Transfer Arrangement in Central America (PTA), designed to protect vulnerable people requiring urgent resettlement.

MIRPS is framed as a means of forestalling irregular movement from the regions, which is a major issue in Mexico and at the US / Mexico border. UNHCR recommended 785 people for resettlement in 2016 through the PTA; 150 were resettled to the US. Since then, an additional 3,100 people were identified. Canada accepted 11 people in 2017, zero in 2018, and zero in 2019, and ended engagement with the PTA in 2020. It also ignored appeals from UNHCR in Mexico to resettle vulnerable refugees, particularly LGBTQ+ asylum seekers. This is despite the fact that Canada has driven the process of seeding additionality through the GRSI. By 2021, the PTA was all but a dead-letter aspect of MIRPS.

Assuming that refugees from the regional would prefer to stay in the hemisphere, Canada and the US could immediately clear the backlog of refugees from NCA states proposed by UNHCR under the PTA. The number is exceedingly modest, yet the impacts on the region could be profound, and extended over subsequent years to take advantage of complementary labour migration pathways, which are already being piloted by Canada.<sup>54</sup>

### **C) Funding the International Refugee Regime**

Finally, a club of democratic states must also consider funding structures for UN agencies to address major financial gaps and operational coverage. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted that 2022 will see a record funding gap. Current pledges sit at roughly \$15.2bn USD, or less than one third, of the required \$48.7bn USD. Likewise, ten of UNHCR’s operations around the world, ranging across Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America are underfunded by 50-76% as of

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<sup>53</sup> Govt. of Canada. "Admissions of Resettled Refugees by Country of Citizenship and Immigration Category". Online: <https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/4a1b260a-7ac4-4985-80a0-603bfe4aec11>; Refugee Processing Centre "Archives: Refugee Arrivals by State and Nationality". Online: <https://www.wrapsnet.org/archives/>.

<sup>54</sup> Smith, Craig Damian and Dana Wagner. 2021. "How Canada can Address Skills Shortages by Improving Access to Economic Pathways for Refugees and Displaced People in Latin America," *CERC Policy Briefs* No. 1, April. [https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/cerc-migration/Policy/Final\\_PB\\_Smith\\_Wagner\\_April19.pdf](https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/cerc-migration/Policy/Final_PB_Smith_Wagner_April19.pdf).

2021,<sup>55</sup> which has forced it to cut a range of vital programs from food aid, to protection for women and children, to cash transfers to families. The UNHCR's needs-based budget is roughly twice its annual expenditure. For example, the 2022 emergency appeal for Syrians and vulnerable host communities requested a total of \$10.5 billion USD, which is currently only around 10% funded.<sup>56</sup>

A major part of the problem is that UNHCR relies on voluntary operational and situation-based contributions from donor states, which inherently mean they exercise a significant amount of control over operations, often funding those initiatives which they think most deserving or politically important. These issues have long-been recognized, with myriad policy proposals for addressing funding gaps.<sup>57</sup> Fundamentally, addressing shortfalls will mean that rich states should fund UNHCR and associated humanitarian and development agencies by moving from discretionary funding allocations to automatic budget transfers to UNHCR and humanitarian and development agencies serving refugees in the Global South.

There have been some noteworthy developments to alternative funding sources in recent years. The World Migration and Refugee Council have called for seized foreign assets under Canada's 2017 Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (also referred to as the Magnitsky Law) to be specifically allocated to funding refugee responses. Canada's 2022 Budget Implementation Act specifically takes up that call and allows seized assets to be allocated for "the reconstruction of a foreign state adversely affected by a grave breach of international security; the restoration of international peace and security; and the compensation of victims of a grave breach of international peace and security, gross and systematic human rights violations or acts of significant corruption."<sup>58</sup> Similar bills are currently under discussion in the US, specifically to seize Russian assets for Ukraine.

Yet seized foreign assets alone will not address the major funding shortfalls or provide adequate funding, and are politically fraught. It would readily become apparent that Global North states rely on autocratic and authoritarian governments for migration control deals, and so asset seizures from states culpable in global displacement would run afoul with those deals. All of which to say that a solidarity club would also have to fundamentally reconsider the intersections of policy development. As with resettlement, financial commitments should be predictable and stable, and should likely come in the form of a commitment to increased foreign aid budgets directly to operations for underfunded UN agencies. Crucially, commitments to additional resettlement and complementary pathways will also narrow overall funding gaps by decreasing the global population of displaced people year on year, stretching the impacts of financial contributions.

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<sup>55</sup> UNHCR. 2021. *UNHCR's Most Underfunded Situations in 2021*.

[https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Underfunding-Report-2021.pdf#\\_ga=2.163966839.952103652.1631878127-614254838.1546589775](https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Underfunding-Report-2021.pdf#_ga=2.163966839.952103652.1631878127-614254838.1546589775).

<sup>56</sup> \$10.5b USD is a combined total of \$6.1b for the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and the \$5.4b for the Humanitarian Response Plan for Syria. See: UNHCR. 10 May, 2022. "Message from the United Nations humanitarian, refugee, and development chiefs on the situation in Syria and the region."

<https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2022/5/627a72354/message-united-nations-humanitarian-refugee-development-chiefs-situation.html>.

<sup>57</sup> See for example World Migration and Refugee Council. 2019. *A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System* (pp.41-45). <https://wrmcouncil.org/publications/a-call-to-action-transforming-the-global-refugee-system/>.

<sup>58</sup> Government of Canada. 2022. *An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in Parliament on April 7, 2022 and Other Measures*. Division 31, S.439, Part 5.6 (page 397). [https://www.parl.ca/Content/Bills/441/Government/C-19/C-19\\_4/C-19\\_4.PDF](https://www.parl.ca/Content/Bills/441/Government/C-19/C-19_4/C-19_4.PDF).